Citations:Haishenwai

English citations of Haishenwai

						1975 1976 1977 1980s 1990s	2000s 2010s 2020 2022 2023
ME «	15th c.	16th c.	17th c.	18th c.	19th c.	20th c.	21st c.

• [1931, Dai hyakka jiten‎^[1], volume 27, →OCLC‎^[2]:

  カイサンイ海參嵐 Haishenwai ロシャ領浦鹽斯徳を支那人や洲人の呼ぶ名稱。

  (Note: The above follows the Google Books and HathiTrust OCR transcription blindly.)]

• [1975, Ralph DeSola, “Worldwide A to Z”, in Worldwide What & Where: Geographic Glossary & Traveller's Guide‎^[3], Avon Books, published 1977, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 595, column 2:

  Vladivostok: (Russian — Rule the East) — Hai-shen-wai (Chinese — Trepang Bay).

  (Note: Hai-shen-wai is the hyphenated Wade-Giles-derived name for Haishenwai.)]

• 1975 December 29 [1975 December 28], “NCNA on Growing Threat of New World War”, in Daily Report: People's Republic of China‎^[4], volume I, number 250, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, →ISSN, →OCLC, page A 7:

  At the signing of the second agreement in 1972 it was not far behind the U.S. in nuclear strength. But it had almost caught up with the United States when the Vladivostok (Haishenwai) agreement was signed in 1974. The Vladivostok (Haishenwai) agreement sets no numerical "limit" on both parties since both have to exert themselves before they could attain the stipulated amount of nuclear warheads, while qualitatively it sets no limit at all.

• 1976, Peking Review‎^[5], volume 19, →OCLC, page 17, column 2:

  At the signing of the second agreement, the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreement, it was not far behind the United States in nuclear strength. However, it had for the most part caught up when the Vladivostok (Haishenwai) agreement was signed in 1974. That agreement sets no numerical "limit" on either party since both have to exert themselves before they can attain the stipulated amount of nuclear warheads, while qualitatively it sets no limit at all.

• 1977 April 1 [1977 April 1], “Vance Leaves 'Emptyhanded'”, in Daily Report: People's Republic of China‎^[6], volume I, number 63, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, →ISSN, →OCLC, page A 3:

  In the Moscow talks, Vance presented to the Soviet side two alternative proposals of the U.S. Government. The first suggests a "deep cut" in the ceiling tentatively set by the two countries at Vadivostok (Haishenwai) in 1974 for their strategic missiles and bombers (2,400 for each).

• 1977 April 11 [1977 April 9], “Soviets Pressure Japan in Fishery Negotiations”, in Daily Report: People's Republic of China‎^[7], volume I, number 69, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, →ISSN, →OCLC, page A 7:

  The defence agency source said the Soviet Union has taken the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk as a base not only because it is "suitable for releasing missiles from submarines", but also because there are the Chishima Islands including the northern territories which may serve as "a natural fortress on the sea against U.S. anti-submarine operations". Meanwhile, this part of the sea is situated between Vladivostok (Haishenwai), a base of the Soviet Pacific fleet, and the Petropavlovsk harbour, the only base for nuclear-powered submarines that is accessible to the Pacific and may therefore find it easy to get logistic supplies.

• 1980 August 11 [1980 August 8], “Why Has the Soviet Union Taken a Fancy to Cam Ranh Bay?”, in Daily Report: People's Republic of China‎^[8], volume I, number 156, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, →ISSN, →OCLC, page C 4:

  The Soviet Pacific Fleet is based at Haishenwai [Vladivostok], which is too far away from the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Fleet needs an ice-free port as its base between Haishenwai and the Indian Ocean, and Cam Ranh Bay is an ideal base for this purpose. […] Therefore, by occupying Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Union has been able to advance the foothold of its Pacific Fleet thousands of kilometers south from Haishenwai.

• 1985, Kaiming Su, “Russia's Role in the Second Opium War”, in Modern China: A Topical History [中国近代史话]‎^[9], Beijing: New World Press, →ISBN, →OCLC, page 37:

  While the Chinese forces were engaged in resisting the British-French allied troops elsewhere in China, Russian forces occupied Haishenwai on the Pacific coast in Siberia and renamed it, significantly, Vladivostok (Ruler of the East).

• [1987, Chang Fu-yun [張福運] / Chang Ching-wen [張景文], quotee, “Interviews, 1983”, in Reformer of the Chinese Maritime Customs‎^[10], University of California, →OCLC, page 96:

  Later on, after my return from Vladivostok, in Chinese we call it Hai-ts'an-wai^{[sic – meaning Hai-shen-wai]}, I bought a house from a eunuch next to the central park, a little to the west of the park.

  (Note: Hai-ts'an-wai is the hyphenated Wade-Giles-derived misspelled name for Haishenwai.)]

• 1992, Rafe de Crespigny, “Splinters of Empire”, in China This Century‎^[11], Oxford University Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 23:

  By the Sino-Russian Treaty of Beijing, the Chinese ceded not only the territory north of the Amur but also the maritime province in the east, between the Ussuri River and the Sea of Japan. The Chinese town of Haishenwai, settled by Russian colonists, was renamed Vladivostok ‘Rule the East’, and was developed as a port for foreign trade and for use as a naval base.

• 1994 [1925 December 13], Zedong Mao, “Students Are Selected by the Chinese Guomindang to Go to Sun Yatsen University in Moscow”, in John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, transl., edited by Stuart R. Schram and Nancy J. Hodes, Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949‎^[12], M.E. Sharpe, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 287:

  All these students are preparing for going abroad in separate batches, and the first group will leave in a few days directly for Haishenwai [Vladivostok] by boat.

• 1994, Raymond L. Garthoff, “Asia and American-Soviet Relations”, in The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War‎^[13], Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 653:

  The first public Chinese reaction was a statement by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian on August 13, in which he said simply that the Chinese had "taken note" of Gorbachev's statement "made in Vladivostok (Haishenwai)," thus interjecting the Chinese name for the Chinese fishing village they claim existed on the site before the Russian colonization of the area.

• [c. 2004, Ren Tianhao, “Hu Weide’s activities as a diplomat during the late-Qing”, in Hu Weide and the Weak Diplomacy of the late Qing/Early Republican Period‎^[14], archived from the original on 2023-05-24, page 77:

  In 1906, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly petitioned the Russian ambassador in China for reparation from the Russo-Japanese War. Although the Russians refused to pay reparations to the people of Manchuria, they paid reparations of 5,000,000 taels for damage to Haicanwai^{[sic – meaning Hanshenwai]} [Vladivostok], which they extracted from China’s payments from the Boxer Protocol.]

• 2008 [2005], Hiroshi Kimura, “Black Ships from the North”, in Mark Ealey, transl., The Kurillian Knot: A History of Japanese-Russian Border Negotiations‎^[15], Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 23:

  In 1860, Muraviev renamed the city of Haishenwai, ceded by China in the Treaty of Peking, “Vladivostok,” that is, “rule” (vladi) “the east” (vostok). This has tended to be interpreted as an example of Russian expansionism, but at least partially represents a response to Anglo-American encroachment in the region. There are occasions when territorial expansion that includes an element of defense, or was started on the pretext of being for defense, loses its original objective and ends merely as expansion. This, though apparently a contradiction in terms, can perhaps be called "defensive expansionism."

• 2009 September 30, “Preparing for takeoff”, in China Daily‎^[16], archived from the original on 2009-10-19‎^[17]:

  Vladivostok, Russia's largest port city on the Pacific Ocean bordering north China, translates to "rule the East" in Russian. But for most Chinese, the city that was controlled by China 140 years ago has another name: Haishenwai, which literally means "sea cucumber cliff."

• 2012 June 23, Roderick MacFarquhar, “Fragile Solidity”, in Russia in Global Affairs‎^[18], number 2, →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 2020-08-03‎^[19]:

  Another blogger underlined that the current harmful consequences were, “the yellow Russians inside China,” i.e. the Chinese Communist Party. There was one blog that reminded me of a conversation I had with a party cadre at Leningrad University in the summer of 1959. The blogger demanded that Russia should return Vladivostok, or Haishenwai as he called it, to China. Most of the anti-Russian blogs were quickly erased, but to this one the embassy replied: “There is no such geographical name as Haishenwai. We cannot return to you something that does not exist.” My interlocutor in 1959 indicated disapproval of a New York Times article on Russia’s vast Eastern territories with indications of what had been Chinese. This was at a time when there was no open hostility between Moscow and Beijing.

• 2014 March 28, “Air China to Start Beijing - Vladivostok Service”, in TASS‎^[20], archived from the original on 09 September 2022‎^[21]:

  Vladivostok is also known in Chinese as Haishenwai. Located in the southern extremity of Muravyov-Amursky Peninsula in the east of the Eurasian continent, Vladivostok is close to Russia's borders with China and North Korea.

• 2015, Michael Meyer, “To the Manchuria Station!”, in In Manchuria: A Village Called Wasteland and the Transformation of Rural China‎^[22], Bloomsbury Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 103:

  In 1860, nearly six thousand miles from Moscow, on a piece of coastline Chinese and Manchu fishermen called Haishenwai (Sea Cumber^{[sic – meaning Cucumber]} Cliffs), Russia built the port of Vladivostok. Now it had to get there.

• 2016 July 23, Andrew Higgins, “Vladivostok Lures Chinese Tourists (Many Think It’s Theirs)”, in The New York Times‎^[23], →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 2016-07-27, Asia Pacific‎^[24]:

  Yet, like nearly all Chinese who visit a city whose Russian name means “master of the East,” Mr. Cui is absolutely certain about one thing: The place should really be called Haishenwai, the name it had back when China was master in these parts.
  A native of the Chinese province of Jilin in Manchuria, Mr. Cui said it was a “historical fact” that the home of Russia’s Pacific Fleet and the showcase of President Vladimir V. Putin’s ambitions to project his country as an Asian power is in reality Chinese territory.

• 2018 September 10, “Discover Vladivostok: Seven delicacies you can't miss”, in Gu Liping, editor, China News Service‎^[25], archived from the original on 2020-01-28‎^[26]:

  Chinese called the bays near Vladivostok Haishenwai, the bays of sea cucumber, in ancient times. The not-very-appetizing appearance of the sea cucumber actually hides its miraculous qualities. It is both food and medicine in Asian culture.

• 2020 July 2, Shiwei Shen, Twitter‎^[27], archived from the original on 2023-05-26‎^[28]:

  This “tweet” of #Russian embassy to #China isn’t so welcome on Weibo
  “The history of Vladivostok (literally 'Ruler of the East') is from 1860 when Russia built a military harbor.” But the city was Haishenwai as Chinese land, before Russia annexed it via unequal Treaty of Beijing.

• 2020 July 3, Sidharth Shekhar, “Russia's Vladivostok celebration irks Chinese diplomat, says 'in the past it was our Haishenwai'”, in Times Now‎^[29], archived from the original on 2020-07-04:

  A video posted on Chinese microblogging website Weibo by the Russian embassy of a party held today to celebrate the 160th anniversary of Vladivostok sparked online outrage with Chinese diplomats, journalists and users referring to the city by its old name ‘Haishenwai’.
  Vladivostok which once used to be part of China’s Qing dynasty and was known as Haishenwai was annexed by the Russian empire in 1860 after China’s defeat by the British and the French in the Second Opium war.
  Reacting to Russian embassy’s tweet, Shen Shiwei, a journalist working with the state-owned broadcaster CGTN, tweeted: “This “tweet” of #Russian embassy to #China isn’t so welcome on Weibo. The history of Vladivostok (literally 'Ruler of the East') is from 1860 when Russia built a military harbor. But the city was Haishenwai as Chinese land, before Russia annexed it via unequal Treaty of Beijing.”

• 2022, Janusz Bugajski, “Neighborhood Impact”, in Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture‎^[30], Jamestown Foundation, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 397:

  The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, signed by Russia and China in 2001, failed to fully resolve the outstanding border contests. For instance, when Moscow celebrated the 160-year anniversary of the founding of Vladivostok in 2020, the state-owned China Global Television Network asserted that Vladivostok unjustly replaced the Chinese city of Haishenwai in the “unequal Treaty of Beijing” of 1860. Under immense international pressure, China’s northeastern territories of Outer Manchuria were awarded to the Russian Empire and now form Primorski Krai and a substantial part of Khabarovsk Krai.

• 2022 February 17, Chunshan Mu, “Why China Will Not Support a Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, in The Diplomat‎^[31], archived from the original on 17 February 2022:

  For many Chinese people, when the^{[sic – meaning they]} see the Ukraine crisis, they think of Russia’s territorial expansion into China more than 100 years ago. You will never see this point raised in the state media, but you can find it easily on Chinese social media. Many people comment on the Weibo page of the Russian embassy in China, asking Russia to return Haishenwai (Vladivostok in Russian) to China. As the crisis in Ukraine deepens, many Chinese netizens accuse Russia of being an aggressor.

• 2022 October 24, Craig Hooper, “With Moscow Distracted, Xi Jinping Could Turn China’s Gaze To Russia”, in Forbes‎^[32], archived from the original on 29 April 2023:

  Vladivostok, Russia’s military and commercial gateway to the Pacific, is still described in China by the city’s old Chinese name, Haishenwai, or “sea cucumber bay.” Chinese resentment over the centuries old agreements that established China’s northern frontier remains a society-wide staple.

• 2023 February 25, Jeff Pao, “China’s ironic reticence on land grab in Ukraine”, in Asia Times‎^[33], archived from the original on 2023-02-25, China‎^[34]:

  Under Beijing’s new directive, Vladivostok once again is called Haishenwai (meaning Sea Cucumber Bay) while Sakhalin Island is called Kuyedao. The Stanovoy Range is back to being called the Outer Xing’an Range in Chinese.

• 2023 February 26, Bohdan Nahaylo, “OPINION: China Challenges Russia by Restoring Chinese Names of Cities on Their Border”, in Kyiv Post‎^[35], archived from the original on 2023-02-26, World‎^[36]:

  The Asia Times noted on Feb. 25 that it is ironic that while releasing a peace plan this week “which conspicuously fails to say clearly whether Moscow should with draw its troops” from Ukraine’s Donbas region and Crimea,” China “this very month, made a politically sensitive change in its official word view – a change that affects Russia.”
  It elaborates that “Under Beijing’s new directive, Vladivostok once again is called Haishenwai (meaning Sea Cucumber Bay) while Sakhalin Island is called Kuyedao. The Stanovoy Range is back to being called the Outer Xing’an Range in Chinese.”

• 2023 March 21, Jan van der Made, “Territorial dispute between China and Russia risks clouding friendly future”, in Radio France Internationale‎^[37], archived from the original on 2023-03-21, Geopolitics‎^[38]:

  On 14 February, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources (CMNR) issued a decree on the use of names on international maps. Some cities in Russia, the decree rules, must now carry Chinese names, replacing their Russian ones.
  According to the 10-page document, maps covering Russia's east Siberia must carry the original Chinese names of eight large cities.
  The best known, Vladivostok, the administrative capital of the region, is now to be officially called "Haishenwai".

• 2023 March 23, Graham Allison, “Xi and Putin Have the Most Consequential Undeclared Alliance in the World”, in Foreign Policy‎^[39], archived from the original on 27 March 2023, Argument‎^[40]:

  On today’s map, large swaths of what was in earlier centuries Chinese territory are now within Russia’s borders. This includes Moscow’s key naval base in the Pacific, Vladivostok—which on Chinese military maps is still labeled by its Chinese name, Haishenwai. The 2,500-mile border between the two nations has repeatedly seen violent clashes, most recently in 1969.

• 2023 March 24, Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, “China’s Maps Call Vladivostok ‘Haishenwai’”, in The New York Sun‎^[41], archived from the original on 2023-03-24‎^[42]:

  The standards, released by the Ministry of Natural Resources on the approval of the State Council of the people’s republic, require that all Chinese maps “accurately reflect the scope of China’s territory.” In addition to islands in the South China Sea and Free China – which is to be called “Taiwan Province” – this also appears to include eight Russian cities that span the Sino-Russian border.
  Vladivostok has become “Haishenwai.” Khabarovsk, Russia’s easternmost city, “Boli.” Sakhalin, the Kremlin’s outpost in the Pacific Ocean, just 27 miles north of Japan, is now “Kuedao.”^{[sic – meaning Kuyedao]}

• 2023 March 30, “Chinese nationalists are annoyed about colonial-era place names”, in The Economist‎^[43], archived from the original on 2023-03-30, China‎^[44]:

  At the start of a three-day visit to Moscow on March 20th, China’s president, Xi Jinping, was welcomed by his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, with a feast featuring quail, venison and pavlova. At home, the thoughts of some Chinese nationalists were focused on another Russian city—one famous for its sea cucumbers, a popular Chinese delicacy. In China, the far-eastern Russian city of Vladivostok has been known traditionally as Haishenwai, meaning “sea-cucumber bay”. More to the point, as these patriots point out, it was once ruled by China.

• 2023 May 17, Jeff Pao, “China’s Jilin to ship goods via Vladivostok”, in Asia Times‎^[45], archived from the original on 2023-05-16, China‎^[46]:

  In China, “patriotic” columnists are welcome to criticize western powers for acquiring Qing lands by force during the 19th century. Some said following the successful handovers of Hong Kong and Macau from Britain and Portugal, respectively, that Beijing should consider recovering Haishenwai and the Stanovoy Range from Russia.
  Such a call has grown among Chinese netizens since the Ministry of Natural Resources on February 14 published a new version of its world map – directing a return to using the Chinese names of eight cities and areas occupied by the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
  On Monday evening, a Zhejiang-based writer published an article headlined, “Haishenwai is basically in a state of semi-recovered.”
  “After so many years, Northeast China has finally gotten back the Haishenwai seaport,” the article says. “The port will help boost our external trade, while a prolonged energy crisis will drag the European economy.”

• 2023 May 21, Ritu Sharma, “China Emerges ‘Biggest Winner’ Of Russia-Ukraine War; Regains Vladivostok Port After 163 Years, Beats Japan In Auto Market”, in The EurAsian Times‎^[47], archived from the original on 2023-05-23, Asia Pacific‎^[48]:

  The Vladivostok port, formerly known as Haishenwai during the rule of the Qing dynasty, will provide cross-border transit for domestic trade shipments in Northeast China’s Jilin province.

• 2023 May 31, Yeping Yin, Tao Mingyang, “China-Russia trade, regional economic development gets boost with Vladivostok being new transit port for domestic trade”, in Global Times‎^[49], archived from the original on 2023-05-31, Economy‎^[50]:

  Vladivostok, now the largest Russian port on the Pacific Ocean, also known historically as Haishenwai in Chinese, will enable traders to diversify their routes and cut transport costs, particularly between industrial hubs in the northeast and manufacturing and trade centers in South China, industry insiders said.

• 2023 June 20, Radek Sikorski, “Europe’s Real Test Is Yet to Come”, in Foreign Affairs‎^[51], archived from the original on 2023-07-18‎^[52]:

  The Chinese government has kept quiet about it, but Radio France International reported in March 2023 that China’s Ministry of Natural Resources had issued new guidelines for maps, requiring the addition of old Chinese names alongside Russian geographical names in eight places along the Russian-Chinese border, including Vladivostok, which should now be referred to as Haishenwai. As if bowing to Beijing, Moscow has said it will open the port of Vladivostok to Chinese transit trade for the first time in 163 years.